Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 revealed the need for a greater array of policy options in tempering housing market activity. Across countries increasing evidence emerged of property market distortions proliferating to other sectors of the real economy, thus highlighting the need for policies which target excessive and destabilising movements in lending, house prices and output levels. While elements of both fiscal and monetary policy have been considered in this regard, a growing body of opinion views macroprudential policies as the optimal policy response, particularly in property markets, because of the preciseness of their focus and the potential flexibility of their application. Accordingly, one such series of measures À limits on loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) ratios À are increasingly under scrutiny. These measures have been adopted for some time by authorities in Hong Kong, China, Korea, Singapore and other emerging market economies, with Canada and Denmark being examples of advanced countries using such limits prior to the crisis. More recently, the Hungarian, Magyar Nemezeti Bank (2010), the Norges Bank (2010), the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (2010) and the Bank of Finland have signalled their adoption.
In international terms, the Irish property market presents as the extreme case in terms of negative spillovers between the housing market, the general economy and the financial sector. With both prices and activity levels increasing substantially over the previous decade, the property sector had, by 2007, assumed a disproportionate significance both on the balance sheets of Irish financial institutions and in the general economy. For example, in terms of employment, the number of persons at work in the construction sector effectively trebled from 97,000 persons in 1995 to 269,000 in 2006 and, by 2008 , the sector directly accounted for one in every eight jobs in the economy. 1 Much of the increase in the Irish housing market activity, particularly post 2000, was fuelled by a sizeable credit bubble. The Irish credit market had been liberalising over a long period of time; however, the ability of financial institutions to avail of international wholesale funding caused a significant shift in the domestic credit supply function. Thus, when the 2007/2008 international financial crisis occurred, the Irish financial system was especially vulnerable. The costs to the economy of the aftermath of the property boom have been truly severe. Between 2007 and 2012, Irish house prices, in nominal terms, fell by over 50%. Given that nearly 40% of the total stock of Irish mortgages was issued between 2004 and 2007, when prices were at their highest, the sharp subsequent decline has given rise to a significant degree of negative equity being experienced by Irish households. When coupled with the sharp increase in unemployment experienced by the Irish economy post 2008, the possibility of substantial credit risk in the mortgage books of Irish banks was one of the main reasons for the financial crisis which engulfed the Irish banking sector. Given its recent turbulent past, the Irish credit market would, therefore, appear to be an ideal candidate for the implementation of financial stability policies. 2 In October 2014, the Central Bank of Ireland proposed the introduction of regulations which will place ceilings on the proportion of mortgage lending at high LTVs and LTIs by domestic financial institutions. The objective of these measures is to increase the resilience of the banking and household sectors to the property market and to try and reduce the risk of bank credit and housing price 'spirals' from emerging in future. required to achieve a comprehensive overview of the impacts of macroprudential measures.
The application, however, of the macroprudential measures comes at a critical stage in the recovery of the Irish housing and mortgage markets in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crisis; while Irish house prices have started to increase quite significantly since early 2013, activity variables such as housing supply and mortgage credit extension still remain at historically low levels. Therefore, there is some debate as to whether developments in the Irish property and credit market actually warrant the application of these measures at this time. 5 We find that the measures will have a significant effect on the housing and mortgage markets. Even under relatively conservative assumptions concerning the potential number of borrowers displaced by such measures, our results suggest the following:
(1) House prices will fall by approximately 6% in the short run due to the macroprudential measures before experiencing a 2% decline over the longer term. (2) Over the same time periods, mortgage credit extension will fall by 20% and 10%, respectively. (3) Finally, housing supply will be 4% lower than what would be the case if the measures had not been applied.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in the next section we review recent developments in the Irish housing market and the role played by excess credit in the domestic mortgage market. A literature review section examines the previous applications of macroprudential rules. The following section outlines the data used in the study, while an empirical section outlines the model of the mortgage and housing market which is used to analyse the proposed macroprudential measures. A final section offers some concluding comments.
The Irish housing and mortgage market Irish property market
The measures outlined by the Central Bank of Ireland are in response to recent developments in the Irish housing market. Irish house prices have varied substantially since 1995.
On average from 1995 until 2007 nominal domestic house prices grew by nearly 12% per annum. By 2007, a number of commentators 6 were of the belief that Irish house prices were significantly overvalued.
With the onset of the international financial crisis, the Irish housing market was particularly vulnerable. After 2007, Irish house prices fell for almost seven years up to early 2013 culminating in a 50% decline from peak to trough. Since then however, as the Irish economy has shown significant signs of recovery, Irish house prices have increased strongly, particularly in the Dublin area. For the nine-month period to September 2014, house prices in Dublin increased, on average, by almost 18% year-on-year. This compares with a comparable national rate of 10% over the same period. Given the strong price increases, some commentary has already focussed on the possibility of another bubble in Irish house prices.
Rather uniquely, during the period of substantial house price increases between 1995 and 2007, supply levels of housing escalated to such an extent that the rate of new housing supply in the domestic market was only just under half that of the United Kingdom despite the presence of a 14-fold difference in population levels. On average, between 2005 and 2007 80,000 housing units were supplied in the Irish market. However, as with the collapse in prices post 2007, housing activity rapidly declined with just over 8000 units being brought to the Irish market in 2012 and 2013.
Irish credit market
The Irish credit market had, since the mid-1980s, been experiencing considerable financial deregulation and liberalisation, involving the removal of credit and interest-rate controls. Table 1 summarises the main developments from the mid-1980s  to 2000. 7 However, the most profound development in the provision of credit, from an Irish perspective, was the increased ability of Irish banks, post euro, to attract deposits from non-residents. Given the build-up in demand side pressures in the Irish economy throughout the late 1990s, Irish financial institutions availed substantially of the increased funding available within the euro area. Figure 1 presents the overall loan to deposit ratio and total external debt levels for the Irish financial sector over the period 2001À2010. The sharp increase in the loan to deposit ratio in the lead up to 2007 is clearly evident as is the surge in the international funding of Irish credit institutions which helped to fund the difference between lending and domestic deposit levels.
Overall, the combined effect was to increase the elasticity of the supply of credit to the household sector. The consequence of such a flatter supply curve was that financial institutions were able to increase the amount of lending to the household sector with little upward pressure on the interest rate. However, this flatter supply curve inevitably led to a substantial increase in debt levels within the Irish economy. Once the financial crisis of 2007/2008 occurred, Irish institutions were particularly vulnerable; given the relatively large amount of mortgage loans quickly subsiding into negative equity, international investors quickly withdrew their funding for Irish institutions. The evaporation of external funding resulted in a sizeable liquidity problem. Eventually, the fragility of the Irish financial sector was one of the main reasons for the sovereign entering a programme of support with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission (EU) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in November 2010.
The Irish housing market boom saw the development of financial products which encouraged or facilitated homeownership. Doyle (2009) shows that the number of Irish mortgage products increased substantially over the course of the boom, from 181 in 1997 to 254 in 2009. Mortgage products with repayment terms longer than the traditional 20 years were introduced. Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios began to increase and a 100% mortgage product was introduced, compared to the previous maximum of 92% for most borrowers.
8 Lending criteria moved from income multiples to a limit based on the ratio of mortgage service cost to income. Interest only and tracker mortgages were introduced.
9 These are, amongst others, identified as key features in the development of the mortgage market by Doyle (2009) .
Apart from 2005, a substantial proportion of mortgages were taken out with a 31À35 year term, accounting for approximately 40% or over of mortgages drawn down in each year between 2006 and 2010. Rising house prices during the housing market boom required borrowers to draw down larger loans. The affordability of these high loan-to-value loans was aided by increasing the length of the mortgage term. According to Doyle (2009) , 82% of new first-time buyer contracts in 2007 had a maturity length greater than 30 years, a figure significantly higher than those of other euro area countries. This may partly be due to Ireland having a higher proportion of younger mortgage holders (Doyle, 2009) . Longer-term mortgages generally mean that the principal is being repaid at a slower pace, reducing the equity the borrower is accumulating in their dwelling. Growing use of derivatives to manage risk.
Fixed-rate mortgages introduced by some banks for the first time.
Mortgage securitisation.
Secondary liquidity requirement abolished.
Equity withdrawal and loan consolidation.
Reduction in primary liquidity ratio 8%À2%.
A current assessment
Given the significant fluctuations in the experiences of the Irish mortgage and property markets, it is worth assessing the current state of such markets, particularly as macroprudential measures, as noted in the literature review below, can have significant impacts on housing market activity. Indeed the scale of the post 2007 downturn in housing market activity has prompted a number of official reports into the sector (see Construction 2020 Construction , 2014 National Economic and Social Council, 2014; Social Housing Strategy 2020 . Using a suite of different house price models to generate a fundamental house price, McQuinn (2014) concludes that house prices are still undervalued in the Irish market. Notwithstanding the substantial increase in prices through , McQuinn (2014 estimates that the current state of key fundamental variables in the Irish economy such as income levels, interest rates, demographics and housing supply indicates that house prices at the end of 2013 were undervalued between 12% and 20%. 10 As noted in Kennedy and McQuinn (2011) and Kennedy and McQuinn (2012) , the Irish property sector followed the example of other markets, which had experienced sizeable house price bursts, in witnessing prices 'overcorrecting' or falling by more than what the deterioration in market fundamentals would have suggested. Figure 2 plots an update of actual and fundamental house price from McQuinn (2014) . The updated analysis indicates that prices, at end 2014, were still undervalued by approximately 10%. Figure 3 plots the historical levels of housing supply and credit advanced to Irish households for house purchases. As can be seen from both graphs, present levels of activity are quite below recent historical levels. In the case of mortgage credit, the total stock has been falling consistently since 2007, while the growth rates of credit have been persistently negative since 2010. While mortgage loans have been extended since this time, the significant degree of mortgage repayments over the period has consistently exceeded the draw-down of new mortgages.
In the case of housing supply, along with the actual level, we also plot what we term the equilibrium level of 25,000 units. Duffy, Byrne, and Fitzgerald (2014) , based on a microeconomic analysis of tenure choice and household formation, conclude that this amount of housing units is required, on a per annum basis, over the next 15 years to meet the underlying demand in the Irish market. Clearly the present actual level of supply is significantly less than the level which pertained at the height of the property boom but it is also somewhat below the long-run equilibrium level indicated by . Therefore, present developments in the property and mortgage sector would suggest that the Irish market is still very much in a recovering mode from the intense crash experienced between 2007 and 2012. Barrett, Duffy, and McQuinn (2015) summarise many of the issues affecting the supply of housing at present in the Irish market including planning difficulties, problems concerning infrastructure and the lack of development finance for property developers. 
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Macroprudential policies: a brief literature review
The scale and depth of the international financial crisis revealed the complex relationship between the housing market, the real economy and the financial sector across a number of countries. Arestis, Mooslechner, and Wagner (2010) and Jones, White, and Dunse (2012) , for example, assess the impacts of the credit crunch on housing markets across countries. Studies examining the potential effectiveness of macroprudential measures such as loan-to-value and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios have naturally increased considerably over the past decade. Borio, Furfine, and Lowe (2001) , in a relatively early review, outline the role loan-to-value limits could play in curbing pro-cyclical bank lending.
11 This is the based on the observation that procyclical bank lending is likely to be greater, the higher the average loan-to-value ratio as the higher the ratio, the higher is the marginal amount of new lending that can be granted for a given change in the value of the collateral.
A significant body of work, mainly at the IMF, has, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, explored the use of different macroprudential policies across countries.
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A 2010 survey reports that nearly 70% of the 49 countries surveyed use either loan-to-value ratios or debt/loan-to-income ratios, while most of these countries use judgement almost entirely in both designing and calibrating the instruments in question. In the light of this and other survey work, Caruana (2010) and Crowe, Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and Rabanal (2011) conclude that limits on both loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios are the most effective policy option, particularly, in tempering property markets.
In 1997, China introduced LTV limits and followed with debt-to-income limits in (IMF, 2011b . Debt-to-income limits were introduced in Korea approximately three years after the introduction of LTV limits. Igan and Kang (2011) examine the introduction of LTV and LTI limits in Korea. Combining a regional data-set and survey data they find evidence that transactions levels fall after the introduction of such limits. They find that the implementation of an LTV limit had a negative statistically significant impact on house price growth. Although the coefficients for a debt-to-income limit were also negative they were not statistically significant. In the three-month period following a tightening of regulations, they found an average drop of 16% in transaction activity in response to a tightening of LTV limits and a 21% average drop in response to tightening debt-to-income regulations. In addition, using survey data they are able to model the effect of limits on property buying decisions and perceptions on the direction of house prices. The results show that both LTV and debt-to-income ratio tightening delay property-buying decisions and push down house price expectations. Wong, Fung, Fong, and Sze (2008) cite prudent lending practices guided by LTV and LTI limits in mitigating the house price boom in Hong Kong in 1994 and buffeting the financial system against the fallout from the crash in 1997.
Relatively few studies have empirically assessed the impact on both house prices and activity of these macroprudential measures. A notable exception is Almeida, Campello, and Liu (2006) , who, using cross-country variation in LTVs, provide evidence supporting the 'financial accelerator' mechanism. In particular, they find that both house prices and new mortgage borrowings are more sensitive to aggregate shocks in countries with higher LTVs. They also find that the empirical relationship between LTVs and income sensitivities is stronger where the income constraint is less likely to be a binding factor. Therefore, households, who are constrained by the availability of collateral, have more procyclical debt capacity in the presence of higher LTVs. Crowe et al. (2011) , using a simple cross-country panel data model, estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in maximum LTV results in a 13% increase in nominal house prices, while for the US market, Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010) report that a 10 percentage point increase in LTVs for firsttime buyers results in house prices increasing between 8% and 11%.
In a general equilibrium context, a number of studies have recently examined the stabilisation benefits of countercyclical loan-to-value rules in rational expectations models. Angelina, Neri, and Panetta (2011); Christensen and Meh (2011); Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2011) and Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) all examine the relative merits of macroprudential (LTV rules in particular) visa-vis monetary policy in tempering growth in credit aggregates, while Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino (2013) find that a debt-to-income type constraint is the optimal policy response to curtail excess volatility in a model economy. Many of these approaches specify the counter-cyclical rule as some function of credit growth within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework.
Both the loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios naturally complement each other in dampening the cyclicality of collaterised lending, with the LTV addressing the wealth aspect and the DTI the income aspect of the same risk. Fernandez-Corugedo and , for example, note the possibility of a trade-off between these concepts being offered by mortgage providers -the debt-to-income ratio could be increased when the loan-to-value ratio is reduced, thereby keeping the overall risk exposure of the portfolio constant. Campbell and Coco (2011) argue that regulators and mortgage providers should think about combinations of these concepts rather than controlling these levers in isolation, while McCarthy and McQuinn (2013) provide evidence of differences in the usage of both credit channels by Irish credit institutions during the period 2000À2010.
A model of the Irish housing and credit markets
To show how restrictions on the loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios affect the dynamics of both markets, we modify a model of the Irish housing and credit markets outlined in to incorporate a role for the impact of macro-prudential policy.
Our model comprises two blocks: one relating to the market for mortgage credit and the other relating to the housing market. Our model is 'structural' in the sense that within each block we disentangle the factors that drive supply and demand. Thus, our model contains supply and demand equations for each market and equations showing how the mortgage and housing stocks evolve due to the flow of new mortgage lending and the flow of new housing units. Importantly, both markets are modelled jointly, so that contemporaneous spillovers in both directions can be captured.
We first consider the model's mortgage block. As mentioned, this comprises equations for mortgage demand, the supply of mortgage credit and an equation for the mortgage stock. As macroprudential policy instruments such as loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios target new mortgage lending rather than the outstanding stock, we model mortgage demand in terms of the volume of new mortgage lending rather than the total stock of mortgage credit. Following , the demand for real mortgage credit in our framework is a function of the real mortgage rate (RMorRate), real house prices (HPrices) and personal disposable income (Income). Mortgage interest rates together with income levels determine the repayment burden of mortgage debt on the household, while house prices determine the level of security that can be provided against this debt. However, LTV and LTI ratios also act as quantitative restrictions on the demand for mortgage credit. 13 The LTI and LTV ratios can be interpreted as indicators of credit conditions that reflect affordability and leverage constraints. For example, higher LTI ratios allow households to obtain larger mortgages for given levels of interest rates and income and, therefore, relax the affordability constraint. Similarly, higher LTV ratios mean that the collateral that households offer as security against the mortgage is now subject to a lower 'haircut' by banks and allows borrowers to obtain more credit for a given level of the price of the asset.
As regulatory limits on LTV and LTI ratios have only recently been introduced as part of the macroprudential policy framework in Ireland, there are clear difficulties inherent in modelling the potential impact of these prudential instruments on Irish housing and credit markets. Our framework assumes that, for given levels of interest rates, income and house prices, banks will, in the absence of regulatory restrictions, increase or decrease LTI and LTV ratios based on changes in their own risk preferences or in other supply-side factors. In the context of Irish credit markets, there is considerable evidence that banks varied these ratios independently of cyclical conditions in order to achieve desired lending targets.
14 Therefore, we argue that the imposition of prudential limits on the LTV and LTI has a similar impact on credit conditions to a reduction in these ratios that is driven by supplyside factors. In effect, banks extend less credit for given levels of the demand-side variables. In order to adjust the LTV and LTI ratios so that they purely reflect changes in supply-side factors, we need to remove the impact of factors that generate cyclical changes in the ratios and that are unrelated to changes in credit conditions (see Duca, Muellbauer, & Murphy, 2011; . Table 2 shows the impact of these cyclical factors on LTV and LTI that are computed from our data on average mortgages, house prices and disposable income, which we refer to as LTV raw and LTI raw . The results clearly show that house prices and income levels have the most important impact on these ratios over the cycle, although we find evidence that unemployment rates and interest rates also play a role.
The residuals from these regressions capture the variation in the LTV and LTI ratios that are not related to demand factors or that are 'endogenous' to the economic cycle. These residuals are then accumulated to form series for the LTI and LTV that reflect exogenous variation in these ratios and that capture the loosening or tightening of credit conditions by banks themselves. We argue that the autonomous change in the ratios by the banks will have a similar impact on credit demand as the introduction of regulatory changes by a macroprudential policymaker.
A key issue in modelling the dynamics of credit and housing markets is the order of integration of the variables, which will govern the nature and duration of shocks that affect each market. Table A1 presents the results of unit root tests for the variables that affect new mortgage lending, as well as the other variables in the model. As new mortgage lending is stationary, we model the volume of lending as a function of other stationary variables. This requires including income and house prices in first differences rather than in levels. 15 Q1 1988-Q4 2013 Q1 1988-Q4 2013 Notes: Table 2 shows the cyclical factors that influence on the 'raw' LTV and LTI ratios, which are the ratios computed using the data on average mortgages, house prices and disposable income outlined in the paper. t-Statistics are in parentheses.
A Quandt-Andrews test for the stability of the parameters in the mortgage equation indicated the presence of a statistical break in the relationship between new mortgage lending and its determinants in the second quarter of 2010. 16 This period marked the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis which resulted in Ireland entering a bailout programme at the end of that year. We suggest that these events lead to a spike in macroeconomic uncertainty and a further contraction in credit demand for a given level of the other determinants in the model. We approximate this uncertainty with the spread (Spread) between the 10-year government bonds of Ireland and Germany as the latter was viewed as a safe-haven during the sovereign debt crisis (DeSantis, 2012).
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The demand for new mortgages therefore has the following form:
Although the direct impact of a reduction in the LTI or LTV ratio will be to reduce the volume of new mortgage lending, clearly this reduced flow will over time lead to a lower mortgage stock than would have accumulated in the absence of changes to these ratios. As discussed below, the evolution of the mortgage stock also has an important impact on the dynamics of the mortgage rate and house prices.
We adopt a simple perpetual inventory approach to model the mortgage stock that is similar to that used for the housing stock. Equation (2) shows that the current value of the mortgage stock depends on the flow of new mortgage lending and the mortgage stock from the previous period, which 'depreciates' to factors such as mortgage redemptions. The parameter u measures the rate at which these factors reduce the mortgage stock from the previous period and its average value over the sample period is calculated from the data as 0.015.
The final component of the mortgage block is the supply equation. Here, we assume that due to switching and monitoring costs and other informational asymmetries, the banking sector is characterised by imperfect competition in which banks set interest rates and fully accommodate credit demand at this interest rate (see Degryse, Kim, & Ongena, 2009; Freixas & Rochet, 2008; Nobili & Zollino, 2012) .The supply of mortgage credit is therefore represented by the standard variable mortgage rate and is modelled, in an error correction framework, as a variable markup over the cost of funds which comprise the deposit rate (DepRate) and the money market rate (MMRate). The latter is proxied by the three-month Euribor rate. 18 The markup is assumed to depend on cyclical, risk and policy variables (Davis & Liadze, 2012) . The riskiness of lending to the households sector should, theoretically, reflect the loss given default associated with lending as well as the repayment capacity of households. The former can be captured by the 'undrawn equity' of households (HHEquity) given by the ratio of housing wealth to mortgage debt while we use the unemployment rate (URate) to capture the latter. 19 We also allow macroprudential policy to enter the supply of credit through the constraints on the composition of funding via the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio. This is the ratio of total lending, including mortgages, unsecured lending to household and lending to non-financial corporations, to the stock of deposits from households and non-financial corporations. Variation in the share of wholesale funding has been shown to be a significant driver of the supply of credit in the Irish case (Addison-Smyth, McQuinn, & O'Reilly, 2009; Coates & Everett, 2013) . In our modelling framework, the LTD ratio effectively weights the relative cost of deposit and money market financing so that higher LTD ratios signify greater reliance on the latter. Targets for the LTD were introduced in Ireland as part of the Financial Measures Programme following the recapitalisation of the domestic banking sector. 20 The long-run supply of mortgage lending has the following form:
The dynamics of the mortgage rate are then modelled as adjusting to this longrun relation.
We now consider the model's housing block. On the demand side, house prices are modelled using a standard inverted housing demand function. 21 In this framework, the demand for housing services is assumed to be proportional to the housing stock per capita and is a function of real income, the real rental yield and other factor such as demography that shift the demand schedule for housing . In equilibrium, the rental yield will equal the user cost of housing expressed in terms of house prices. In empirical applications, this model is inverted so that (real) house prices are a function of incomes, the per capita housing stock, the user cost of housing as well as the other variables that shift the demand curve.
Equation (4) therefore relates real house prices to the housing stock (HStock), household disposable income and the user cost of capital (User). We also incorporate a role for demographic change in the demand for housing via new household formation by scaling the housing stock by the number of 25À34 year olds in the population (Pop2534). The user cost of capital is calculated as the difference between the real mortgage rate and expected house prices appreciation, where the latter are approximated as a four-quarter moving average of lagged annual house price inflation (see Kelly & McQuinn, 2014; Murphy, 1998) .
In general, interest rates are generally found to be poor indicators of credit conditions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . More recent studies have highlighted the need to complement the user cost of capital with other indicators that capture shifts in the credit supply schedule such as the LTV . As we explicitly model mortgage lending, a more appropriate indicator of credit rationing or excess credit in our framework is the change in the quantity or stock of mortgage credit outstanding. We normalise the latter by household disposable income as changes in the relation between mortgage credit and income have been found to have the largest impact on credit conditions in the Irish case . 22 The long-run demand for housing has the following form:
We estimate the dynamics of house prices in an error-correction framework and allow changes in the unemployment rate to have an impact in the short run.
The second component of the model's housing block is the supply of new housing units, or housing completions (HCompl), given by equation (5). This equation incorporates the second credit channel in the housing block. As with the housing demand equation, the impact of credit has both an interest rate and non-interest rate channel. The real interest rate on credit to non-financial corporations (RNFCRate) is used to capture the cost of credit, while the stock of construction loans (ConstLoans) is used to capture credit conditions facing construction firms. As the latter is non-stationary in levels, it is included in first differences.
New housing units are also a function of Tobin's Q and cyclical factors which affect construction activity. Our measure of Tobin's Q relates the value of housing investment to its replacement cost (Poterba, 1984) . This is approximated by the ratio of house prices to building costs (BCost), which has also been used to proxy for the 'normal profit' of housing construction therefore determining the level of new housing units in the long run (Kenny, 1999) .
Housing investment tends to be procyclical and can be subject to uncertainty about the future profitability of construction due to the high fixed costs and, thus, the irreversibility of investment (Davis & Heathcote, 2005; Miles, 2009 ). The rise in uncertainty can be associated with an increase in the real option value of waiting which leads to a reduction in current investment (Bloom, 2009).
As uncertainty also tends to be countercyclical (Bloom, 2014), we include a measure of the output gap (Gap) of the Irish economy in the housing completions equation to capture changes in the perceived distribution of future house prices. However, as the construction of the output gap is particularly difficult in the Irish case, 23 we also include the corporate insolvency rate (Insolv) to capture changes in uncertainty. (5) The final component of the housing block is an equation that specifies how the housing stock evolves. Similar to the equation for the mortgage stock, Equation (6) relates housing investment to the housing stock using the perpetual inventory method where the current housing stock depends on the depreciated housing stock from the previous period and current level of housing completions. We assume the housing stock depreciates at a rate (s) of 0.4% per quarter. 24 HStock t D ð1 À dÞÃHStock tÀ1 C HCompl t (6)
Data
The volume of new mortgage lending is constructed using data on mortgage approvals from the Banking and Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI) and Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (DoECLG). To construct average loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios we use the BPFI data on mortgages for the purchase of primary dwelling houses from Q1 2005 and then backcast these ratios using the DoECLG data on average loan size across all mortgage lending. The BPFI data allows us to calculate the average mortgage size for first-time buyers, the cohort of buyers that is most likely to be credit constrained. An important constraint of our analysis is that to backcast this series we are required to use the DoeECLG, for which an individual breakdown of lending to first-time buyers and mover-purchasers is not possible. However, the exogenous variation in the computed LTV and LTI, in which we are primarily interested, should still provide a sufficient and reliable indicator of how credit conditions evolved over time.
The mortgage interest rate is the standard variable rate (SVR) and refers to the mid-point of the representative mortgage rate from the Central Bank of Ireland's Quarterly Bulletin and to the average mortgage rate on new lending from the Central Statistics Office.
The deposit rate, the volume of deposits, the (three-month) money market rate, the interest rate on loans to non-financial corporations, construction lending, unsecured household lending and lending to non-financial corporations are also taken from the Quarterly Bulletin. Quarterly data on personal disposable income, GDP and the consumer expenditure deflator are obtained from the National Institute's NiGEM database for Ireland. The real variables used in the econometric analysis below have been deflated using the latter.
Our house price series is constructed using data from the DoECLG, CSO and the ESRI-Permanent TSB house price index. 25 The annual housing stock is obtained from the DoECLG and is interpolated using quarterly estimates of new housing completions, also from the DoECLG. In our econometric analysis, the rate of corporate insolvencies is used to reflect the macroeconomic environment facing construction firms. This is calculated using data on corporate insolvencies and company registrations from the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (DJEI). Finally, all data are seasonally adjusted where necessary using the Census Bureau's X13 seasonal adjustment program.
Results
The equations for new mortgage lending, the mortgage interest rate, house prices and housing completions are jointly estimated by Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS). Potentially endogenous variables are instrumented using lags of the endogenous variable and other exogenous variables. Figure 4 compares the actual values of new mortgage lending, the mortgage rate, housing completions and house prices with those predicted by the model over the sample period. In general, our model fits the data quite well, although there are periods of over-and under-prediction. Table A2 presents the results of diagnostic tests on the model. As testing parameter stability and the joint behaviour of residuals is difficult in a system of equations we conduct these tests for each equation individually. The results suggests that the residuals are 'well-behaved' and the Quandt-Andrews test for structural breaks does not indicate any significant and unaccounted for problems with parameter instability. Finally, we perform a test on the joint-normality of the residuals in the system of equations and the results indicate that the residuals do not suffer from excess kurtosis or skewness. Overall, we are satisfied that the results indicate that the model is well specified. Table 3 presents the estimates of supply and demand in the mortgage market. 26 In terms of mortgage demand, new mortgage lending exhibits a moderate degree of persistence with a coefficient of 0.67 on the first lag. 27 This confirms the finding from the unit root tests that the level of new mortgage lending is stationary in levels. In addition, the real cost of credit, given by the real standard variable mortgage rate, has a negative and significant effect on mortgage demand.
Real household disposable income has the largest effect on mortgage demand in both the short and the long run, thus emphasising the impact of affordability constraints or repayment capacity on the ability to obtain larger mortgages. The long-run elasticity of new mortgage lending with respect to changes in income is over 2. Collateral constraints are also important. Higher house prices, therefore, allow households to borrow more for a given LTV. This highlights the suitability of implementing LTV targets that are counter-cyclical for addressing excessive credit growth.
Importantly, given the focus of this paper, we find that the adjusted LTV and LTI ratios have positive and significant effects on the demand for mortgage credit. Interestingly, we find that the demand elasticity of the LTV is almost twice that of the LTI. In the long-run, a 1% increase in the LTV ratio raises the volume of new mortgage lending by over 2%, whereas a 1% increase in the LTI ratio raises new mortgage lending by just over 1%. 28 These results suggest that prudential policy, by targeting these ratios, can have a significant impact on restraining credit growth.
Finally, the spread between the Irish and German bond rates has a negative and significant effect on new mortgages. As mentioned previously, this variable is mainly intended to capture the spike in macroeconomic uncertainty that arose from the sovereign debt crisis and which may have led to potential mortgage borrowers postponing the house purchase decision.
On the supply side, the nominal SVR adjusts to its long-run equilibrium at a rate of over 50% per quarter. In addition, the mortgage rate is positively affected by higher funding costs and greater levels of household-specific lending risk. Both the deposit and the money market rate have a significant effect on the mortgage rate. The long-run elasticity of the mortgage rate with respect to the three-month Euribor, our benchmark money market rate, is 0.79, while the elasticity with respect to the deposit rate is 0. 25. 29 The results also suggest that banks reduce mortgage interest rates when they have relatively greater access to wholesale funding.
As mentioned in the previous section, both 'undrawn equity' and unemployment are used to approximate the level of risk associated with secured lending to households. The coefficient on the household equity variable suggests that a 1% increase in the ratio of house prices to mortgage debt per household reduces the SVR by approximately one-tenth of a percentage point. Similarly, a 1% increase in the (log) unemployment rate raises the SVR by approximately 7.5 basis points in the long run.
We now turn to the estimates of the supply and demand equations for the housing market, shown in Table 4 . The house price equation is estimated in error-correction form with house prices adjusting to a long-run relation consisting of the demand for housing services, the cost of capital, disposable income and mortgage credit. The error-correction terms suggest that house prices adjust to their long-run equilibrium at a rate of 22% per quarter. The long-run elasticities for both the user cost and income are consistent with previous estimates for Ireland (see .
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Similar to Kelly and McQuinn (2014) and , the demand for housing services has a large impact on house prices. A 1% rise in the ratio of the housing stock to the population of 25-34 year olds raises house prices by over 1% in the long run. Our measure of credit conditions is also positive and significant, indicating the importance of allowing for a non-interest rate credit channel in the determination of Irish house prices. In the short run, house price dynamics are also affected by changes in income, credit conditions and unemployment. On the supply side, housing completions exhibit a high degree of persistence with a coefficient on the level of the previous period of 0.75. The results indicate that a Tobin's Q view of residential investment is consistent with housing construction in Ireland. This implies that the profitability of housing construction is a clear driver of housing construction in the Irish case, so that the supply response of housing will be contingent on how house prices move relative to building costs. However, housing supply also depends on credit condition and we also find that the impact of credit on the residential construction sector operates via both prices (interest rates) and quantities.
Finally, our indicators of the macroeconomic environment appear to be important. The output gap is negative and highly significant and may reflect pessimistic expectations about the future demand for housing. 31 Similarly, the corporate insolvency rate is also negative and significant. Importantly, both the output gap and the corporate insolvency rate are insignificant if we exclude the period since the onset of the financial crisis from our sample. In addition, structural break tests indicate a statistical break in the relation between completions and profitability and credit variables since mid-2007 that is absent when the output gap and insolvency rate are included.
We now apply our model to assess the likely impact of the regulatory limits on LTV and LTI that have recently been introduced in Ireland.
Simulating the effect of LTV and LTI restrictions
The Central Bank of Ireland, as the Irish macroprudential authority, introduced regulatory limits on the share of high LTV and LTI lending by Irish mortgage lenders in January 2015. Specifically, banks must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80% loan-to-value (LTV) to no more than 15% of the aggregate flow of all housing loans for principal dwelling purposes and for primary dwelling purchase above 3.5 times loan-to-income (LTI) to no more than 20% of that aggregate value (Central Bank of Ireland [CBI], 2015) . 32 The mortgage demand equation outlined above models new mortgage lending as a function of average LTV and LTI ratios. In order to simulate the impact of these restrictions, we calculate how the proposed restrictions would affect the average values of the LTV and LTI ratios. Table A3 is reproduced using data from CBI (2014) and shows the distribution of lending according to different LTV and LTI ratios. The share of lending over an LTV of 80% was 44% in 2013, while the share of lending with an LTI of over 3.5 was 23%. 33 In the following simulations we, therefore, consider how the new mortgage restrictions would change the weighted-average LTV and LTI using this data. 34 The weighted-average LTV and LTI using these data are 83.75% and 3.66, respectively.
In order to estimate how the proposed restrictions would affect the average LTV and LTI we make a number of assumptions:
(1) First, we assume that banks would distribute the 15% of lending over the LTV cap and 20% over the LTI cap in a similar way to the distribution observed in the most recent year for which data is available. (2) Second, we make certain assumptions about the number of potential high-LTV and high-LTI borrower who would be affected by the new regulations. Clearly, some borrowers could obtain the higher deposit requirement from savings, from parents, through personal loans or loans from non-mortgage financial institutions. These borrowers could then obtain mortgages with an LTV ratio at the maximum level of 80% rather than having to exit the mortgage market. (3) Therefore, we consider different assumptions about the proportion of these potential mortgagors that will be unable to obtain the higher deposit. We refer to these as the percentage of borrowers 'displaced' by the regulatory restrictions. In the first case, we assume that 25% of potential high-LTV mortgagors exit the mortgage market, which reduces the weighted-average LTV and LTI by 8 percentage points and 0.04, respectively. Our more extreme scenario supposes that 50% of such borrowers exit the market, thereby reducing the average LTV and LTI by 14 percentage points and 0.07, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the lending restrictions on new mortgage lending in terms of percentage deviation from the baseline level of no mortgage restrictions. Note that this is an in-sample simulation in which we first solve the system of Equations (1)À(6) using historical data to construct a baseline scenario. We then vary the historical values of the LTV and LTI ratios and solve the model for each of the endogenous variables with the new values for these ratios. The results in Figure 5 therefore represent the percentage difference in the values of the endogenous variables between both scenarios.
In summary, our model therefore allows us to ask the following question: 'what would happen to mortgage demand, the mortgage interest rate, house prices and housing supply over time if a macroprudential policymaker were to suddenly and permanently reduce the loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios by a particular amount?' When we assume that only 25% of borrowers who would have obtained mortgages with LTV ratios above 80% now obtain them at the new LTV limit, mortgage lending reaches a peak decline of 20% relative to the baseline after 8 quarters and remains at 10% below baseline in the long-run. The impact assuming a 50% displacement is clearly twice as large.
Our model indicates that the decline in mortgage lending would lead to lower house prices. However, it is important to note that the model contains a mechanism that ameliorates the effect of lower LTV ratios on house prices. Although the direct impact of lower LTVs is to reduce new mortgage borrowing at a given interest rate, there is an indirect channel that supports credit demand via lower interest rates. Consider Equation (3) which describes how banks set the mortgage rate in the model. As the LTV falls, the household equity variable in that equation must rise. Banks, therefore, lower interest rates in response to the lower risk associated with secured lending to households. This is shown in Figure 5 again by the number of potential borrowers displaced.
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Lower interest rates not only raise the quantity of new mortgage lending but also lower the user cost of housing. Both of these credit effects will act to offset the Figure 5 . Simulating the impact of mortgage market restrictions. Note: The solid and dashed lines represent the impact of the LTV and LTI measures assuming that 25% and 50% of potential high-LTV and high-LTI borrowers are displaced, respectively. All graphs show the percentage deviation from a baseline of no policy change except for the mortgage rate, which is the deviation in percentage points. effect on house prices of the decline in credit that directly results from the lower LTV. Figure 5 shows how house prices would be affected by the mortgage restrictions.
If we assume that 25% of those borrowers who would have obtained mortgages at LTV ratios above 80% now exit the market due to the higher deposit requirement, house prices reach their peak decline after 4 years, approximately 6% down relative to the baseline and approximately 2% below the baseline in the long run.
The impact on housing completions mirrors that of house prices. Housing construction is a function of the profitability of building new units, given by the ratio of house prices to building costs. As building costs are assumed to remain unchanged in this scenario, the decline in house prices also leads to a decline in the construction of new housing units.
With a quarter of potential borrowers displaced, housing completions fall by 4% relative to baseline after 5 years, thus lagging the peak decline in house prices by approximately four quarters. Finally, the long-run effect of the mortgage restrictions, given this level of displacement, is a housing stock that is almost 1% lower than in the baseline case of no change in policy. In the more extreme scenario of 50% displacement, this impact results in a 2% decline.
Conclusion
The calamitous effects of the banking and property sector crash in the Irish economy have had many profound implications for the citizens of the Irish state. As of the end of 2014, over 14% of Irish mortgage holders were in some form of mortgage arrears, with hundreds of thousands of households still experiencing negative equity. Sizeable increases in personal taxation have been necessary to correct the public finances as substantial amounts of revenue were required to cover the property-related shortfall in the balance sheets of Irish financial institutions. The mere fact that the solvency of the state was significantly jeopardised by the nexus between the property market and the banking system ensures that Ireland, as a small open economy in a heavily integrated financial world, needs an effective and timely macroprudential system to avoid the mistakes of the past.
However, the timing of the application of such a system is crucial. At present, the Irish property and credit market would still appear to be gradually emerging from the complete market failure which pertained between 2007 and 2012. Housing supply is somewhat below fundamental levels, based on underlying structural demand, while growth rates in mortgage lending are still negative. Furthermore, while house prices have increased significantly since early 2013, this is against the backdrop of a 50% fall in prices between 2007 and 2012, which, almost inevitably, saw actual prices fall below the level the state of fundamental variables in the economy would suggest they should be. Thus, price increases in the market at this time would appear to be a function of prices returning to their long-run equilibrium path along with the current low levels of housing supply.
The results in this paper indicate that while the macroprudential measures proposed will more than likely result in house prices being lower than what they otherwise would be, they may also result in fewer houses being supplied to the market and fewer mortgage loans being issued than a 'baseline' or no policy change scenario. As a result, as noted by Whelan (2014) , the measures may well end up curbing house price inflation but at the cost of generating a sub-optimal equilibrium in the housing market, where the measures result in restricted demand for new houses, while the supply-side response in the housing market is impaired by credit and other regulatory restrictions.
The adoption of macroprudential measures may also have other effects on the Irish mortgage market. For example, as noted by Duca et al. (2011) , credit restrictions such as the adoption of macroprudential measures, may result in a change in the tenure choice with a greater number of households electing to rent rather than buy properties. This will have significant implications for the future composition of the Irish housing stock.
In that context, it is regrettable the macroprudential measures were not implemented on an explicit rules basis, which incorporated a counter-cyclical component. This would have enabled cyclical considerations in the housing market to be taken into account in framing any such measures. Borio and Shim (2007) ; Goodhart (2004) ; Galati and Moessner (2013) and Aikman, Haldane, and Nelson (2015) amongst others, have highlighted the importance of rules (or built in stabilisers) as opposed to discretion in calibrating macroprudential policy with the latter noting the necessity of rules for accountability, transparency and efficacy of policy implementation.
29. The long-run elasticity in an error-correction model is obtained by dividing the variable's short-run coefficient by the error-correction term. 30. The user cost coefficient does not change significantly when we consider that house price expectations may adapt more slowly than suggested by a four-quarter moving average of lagged house price inflation. 31. We considered three alternative measures of the 'output gap': the gap derived from a production function taken from the OECD's Economic Outlook, the difference between actual and potential output where the latter is constructed using a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, and a measure of detrended output where GDP is regressed on a linear and quadratic trend. The results reported above refer to the latter but do not change significantly when the alternative measures are used. 32. The restrictions do allow for some relief for first-time buyers who can avail of LTV ratios up to 90% of the purchase price for primary dwellings under 220,000 euro in value. We do not consider this relief in our simulations. 33. It is important to note that these data only pertain to a subset of Irish owned banks. As the newly introduced regulatory limits will affect all retail banks operating in the Irish market, a more relevant data-set for considering the impact of the measures on the housing market is maintained by the CSO. As Duffy and Hanlon (2014) show the share of lending with an LTV of over 80% in that data-set was 60.4% in 2012, which is significantly higher than the share from the CBI data-set for 2013. Unfortunately, as the share of lending at each LTV and LTI is unavailable from the CSO data-set for 2013, we confine our analysis to the CBI data. See Lydon and O'Hanlon (2012) for a discussion of the differences between the two data-sets. 34. CBI (2014) presents the share of lending for LTV and LTI ratios in particular ranges. In calculating the weighted averages, we take the midpoint of the range. For lending at LTV ratios over 100% percent and LTI ratios over 4.5 (as no maximum values are given) we assume that the ranges are 100%À110% and 4.5À5, respectively, and use the midpoints of these ranges. 35. Note that the deviation of the mortgage rate from the baseline level is in percentage points rather than percentage.
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